A Theory of Animation: Cells, L-systems, and Film by Kelty, Christopher & Landecker, Hannah
30
Fight Club. Dir. David Fincher, 
1999. Stills.
Grey Room 17, Fall 2004, pp. 30–63. © 2004 Grey Room, Inc. and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 31
A Theory of Animation: 
Cells, L-systems, and Film
CHRISTOPHER KELTY AND HANNAH LANDECKER
Somehow I too must come to make things; not plastic, but written things—realities
that emerge from handwork. Somehow I too must discover the smallest basic element,
the cell of my art, the tangible immaterial means of representation for everything . . .
—Rainer Maria Rilke, letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé, 19031
David Fincher’s 1999 Gnostic multiple-personality conspiracy epic Fight Club
opens with cells. The sequence is a “night dive” fly-through of the protagonist’s
brain. It begins at a magnification of some 150,000x and zooms out—magnification
decreasing—through the structure of a nerve cell, the folds of the brain, vessels,
sinuses, the skull and skin, and up the barrel of a gun pointed at the head, or, if you
like, at the nerve cell from which we have just been flown.
The sequence was made by Kevin Mack, a computer graphics specialist and
self-described “amateur neurologist,” and Katherine Jones, a medical illustrator
and a participant in the Visible Human Project. Jones storyboarded a ride through
the brain starting in the center of “fearful thought”—the amygdala—and out to
the skin and forehead of actor Edward Norton. Just as striking as this visual rep-
resentation of brain cells is what Mack says of his creation:
The most interesting aspect of what we did, was the fact that we grew the
neurons. Rather than having artists spend months modeling these very com-
plex organic forms, we used L-Systems to grow them. L-Systems are a for-
mal grammar for defining branching structures, primarily for defining the
structure of plants, it was come up with by a botanist named Aristid
Lindenmayer, and it was cool because we were actually growing a brain and
while it wasn’t a functional brain, you know, that’s just the next step.2
Mack makes the incredible claim that what can be seen on screen is not a repre-
sentation of a brain, it is a brain. Mack—in a manner that is not simply naive—
actually believes that something in this image is alive, that it is a vegetable, if not
a human brain. One might say that Mack mistakes the product of his animation
software for the real biological brain it is meant to represent, but what kind of
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“mistake” is this? It is one that Mack is most definitely not alone in making when
it comes to life and software. Contemporary film, art, and architecture are replete
with biologically inflected forms: L-systems, cellular automata, and genetic 
algorithms are used to create (among other things) the complex forests, photo-
realistic skin and hair, and lively and deadly animated crowds that are now regular
features of software packages such as Alias Wavefront’s “Maya” or Softimage’s
“Behavior.” As fast as Hollywood can imagine a computer graphics innovation
like rapid brain fly-throughs and fell orcs in battle, such software packages incor-
porate them as plug-ins, add-ons, and spin-offs.
What, in these examples, does animation software animate? A first temptation
might be to think of such tools as built around biological metaphors in which the
image or the process of creating an image is understood through its apparent like-
ness to some biological object or process—often enthusiastically embraced pre-
cisely for its “realism.” However, this is a comparison of appearances that belies
the conditions by which such images can be seen, understood, and believed to be
alive. For example, the Fight Club image created with L-systems bears a direct
relation to both a particular technique of animating formal grammars and a his-
tory of attempts to model the basic developmental patterns of plant growth by cell
division. This image of the brain is neither a magnification nor an illustration, but
a complete de novo construction of an image “grown” from an analytic theory of
botany, cellularity, and time. It is not a simulation of cells; it is an animation of a
theory of cellular life.
What interests us here is not the status of these images of life in relation to the
real—some ontological existent to which they do or do not correspond as life-
like—but their status as images in relation to knowledge; in particular, in rela-
tion to the systematized knowledge of the biological sciences of the nineteenth
and twentieth century. It is no more a mistake or illusion for Mack to see life in
his animations than it was for the botanist Aristid Lindenmayer to see life in his
theory, for in these images the “life” constantly produced by practices of theory,
observation, modeling, and representation in life science is set into motion.
Analysis of animation, in software or other media, must be connected to the
broader question of how images of life exist in relation to knowledge production
in the life sciences. To that end, this paper undertakes a “media archeology” that
bookends the twentieth century. At one end is the use of microcinematography
to capture living cells on film in the laboratories of the early twentieth century;
at the other is the development of L-systems to describe cellular biological devel-
opment and the transformation of that development into computer graphics ani-
mations. Both examples are concerned with the scientific theory of living things,
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with “life-as-animation,” as well as the technical animation (on a screen) of 
particular living things. Both engage scientific theories as they render new images
on a screen. Via these specific examples we situate contemporary animation in 
a genealogy of the visualization of life that is a helix of the perceptible and the
intelligible—a helix with human-embodied perception as one strand and the
abstractions of formal, mathematical symbols and diagrams as the other.
This focus on microcinematography and L-systems is only one example of the
relation of perceptibility and intelligibility. Other examples are entirely possible,
but this example reflects our particular concern with cells (as opposed to genes,
DNA, organismal form, or evolutionary theory—all of which also lay claim to the
concept of life). Cell films and L-systems are connected not just as attempts to see
life but by the object and the concept of the cell, that “tangible immaterial means
of representation” of life. Time-lapse microcinematography was seen from its
outset in 1907 as a way of both proving cell theory and further investigating its
implications. Nineteenth-century cell theory proposed that all cells arose from
other cells and that all organisms were nothing but congeries of cells. It connected
cell theory directly to the fundamental formal problem of the continuous and the
discrete—How does one original egg cell, during embryo development, become
many cells but one organism, then in turn via sexual reproduction become one
egg cell again? Cell theory meant the cell was the seat of both reproduction and
heredity, of individuality and dividuality, of life and its extension over time.3
Later, L-systems were conceived and built with the cellularity exhibited by micro-
cinematography; although a mathematical formalization, L-systems too, confronted
the problem of the continuous and the discrete via its core assumption about the
growth of plants: that development proceeds by and through the cellular compo-
nents of living organisms.4
Biological science and media theory are rarely thought through together,
despite the obvious flourishing of biologism and developmental thinking in
realms of representation far afield from the laboratory. This article bridges the
fields of media theory and science studies by demonstrating how, on the one hand
life science is conducted and pursued through its media of representation and
how, on the other, some kinds of popular media more generally come to have 
scientific knowledge built into them. For media theorists this article is a challenge
to pursue greater technical and scientific familiarity with new media as a neces-
sary part of their critical repertoire; for scholars in science studies, it offers fur-
ther evidence of the intricate relationship between knowledge production and
representation.5 However, it is an assumption inherent in our approach that there
is no “direction of influence” between the realms of science and spectacle. We
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employ the method of media archeology to trace how, in practice, both images
and theories are transported between these realms and help constitute them 
as such.
Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema books have shown how “aesthetic, philosophical, and
scientific modes of understanding converge in producing cultural strategies for
imagining and imaging the world.” Beyond this is a domain of historical and tech-
nical specificity that adds to those modes of understanding and their particular
convergence in cultural strategies for imagining and imaging the living world.6
This direct and admittedly complicated engagement with historical and technical
detail is offered not just for its own sake but as a critique of euphoric “lift-off”
narratives of new media which focus on the radical difference of analog from 
digital representation—narratives that offer the putative loss of a direct, material
referent in favor of image creation via “pure” numerical manipulation as an ade-
quate means to characterize new media. In the Fight Club opening sequence, for
example, the images are not bound by, and in fact bear little relation to, the exis-
tence of Edward Norton’s actual pro-filmic amygdala. And while it is certainly
the case that these images necessarily exist through mathematics and computing,
to refer to such images as “virtual” or “pure simulacra” is to renounce any critical
understanding of the mathematics, software, or computing machines’ real exis-
tence, leaving us with only the mesmerizing dance of images on a decontextual-
ized screen.
These images are not based in any old mathematics or technology whatsoever.
The axis of analysis that relies on the dichotomies of virtual and real or digital
and analog gives no specificity to the mathematical forms and time-based com-
puting media that subtend these beautiful neurons. To ignore these specifics is to
lose sight of what might be understood as the helix of observation, formalization,
and interpretation that has established the conditions for how we are able to see
life today.
Part 1: Microcinematography and Life
Of all the sciences, biology most earnestly lays claim to questions concerning life
and movement. All the same, it is constituted by many static, analytic, and math-
ematical forms of knowledge. Morphological imagery gives way to taxonomical
tables and evolutionary diagrams. Statistical linkages or molecular structures are
the quantitative foundation to explanations of the visible behavior of living organ-
isms. One could say that such analysis animates biological science: the merely
observable regularities of life seem lifeless until the breath of formal, intelligible,
analytic organization animates them as theory. Nonetheless, the observation of
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life is the necessary route to its analysis. The questions of biology—of develop-
ment, growth, change, death—are, in the first place, set by the perception of
movement over time. In the science of that inexact substance “life,” the vagaries
of belief and the systems of proof are twisted into a helix of the perceptible and
the intelligible.
The Swiss biologist Julius Ries wrote in 1909 with some exasperation about
the experience of observing fertilization of the sea urchin egg and the ensuing 
cell division.
On the one hand, a good many things in a living object happen too quickly,
whereas on the other hand the advancing segmentation demands hours of
the observer’s attention. In this way, impressions become blurred and 
one gets tired. But if one attempts to capture individual pictures through
sketching, one gets at the end only a composition of memory-images. The
segmentation happens so fast that even the fastest sketch-artist cannot keep
up with it.7
Given the difficulties of observation and the shortage of such specimens at any
distance from the sea, Ries lamented that even though the cell theory is one of the
foundations of biological and medical thought, the ability to witness the truth of
omnis cellula e cellula was so limited that it remained “for the student something
true that he must believe, without being able to convince himself of it.”8
Ries initially attempted to capture what he felt to be the wonderful and over-
whelming sight of sea urchin development by fixing as many stages as possible
through classic histological methods. That is, he attempted to fix a different indi-
vidual sea urchin egg/embryo to represent each moment of the developmental
process between fertilization and morula stage. However, this did not “capture”
the phenomenon adequately: “But there is still an enormous difference between
the best fixed preparation and the living one. Aside from the many artifacts that
are stuck to the dead fixed preparation, it also differs from the living in its
motionlessness.”9 The pursuit of a biological preparation that narrowed the gap
between the dead and the living—by which the student might “convince him-
self” of the truth that all cells come from other cells—led Ries to experiment with
the new medium of film, turning away from histology and sketching. Despite con-
tinuing to call his work “chronophotography,” Ries wrote that “my interest is not
concentrated solely on separated images, but on the possibility of reconstructing
the complete phenomenon of fertilization through projection.”10 It was through
projection that a preparation could retain motion and thus greater proximity to
life. The machine, the film projector, was the necessary intermediary between a
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series of separated images and the reconstruction of the “complete phenome-
non”–complete, that is, with motion.
Ries worked with a vertical standing microscope connected to a Lumière cin-
ematograph. The sea urchin egg was kept in a chamber of sea water to ensure its
continued life under as normal as possible conditions. A prism affixed to the ocu-
lar redirected the microscopic image of the egg horizontally into the bellows
between microscope and film camera. The image was then reflected off a mirror,
which was turned so that the observer could see the image from the microscope
or direct it onto the film. A clockwork apparatus attached to the camera took one
image every seven seconds, but to save on the film, which was available in only
limited lengths, Ries set it going only during active phases of division and not
during the spaces such as the hour or so that elapsed between the first division
into two cells and the second division into four.
Rather than a dissection of movement, the projection of the film at sixteen
frames per second was a compression of the time of development into two min-
utes. Furthermore, it was not a simple, homogenous compression of time; some
parts of the sequence were selectively foreshortened. The given narrative of sea
urchin development, already watched innumerable times by scientists looking
through microscopes, in which certain stages were known to take particular
lengths of time, was adopted as the original script of “subjective observation” by
Ries, who then made the decision of how many images at what interval to take
during each stage.
I had always to economize and not photograph until one could see a new
phase of movement. . . . The penetration of the sperm and the formation of a
fertilization membrane lasts some minutes, then an hour passes before the
formation of the primary furrow. The division takes place again very quickly,
then an hour elapses before the second segmentation, etc.; the smaller the
cells become, the more the pauses shorten. Having observed, through sub-
jective examination, the periodicity of the divisions, I could set into motion
or stop the clockwork during the photography at the right time.11
Despite technical problems of lighting and film length, which caused Ries to
describe his production with some dissatisfaction, the effect of viewing the final
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film was “nonetheless surprising”:
Even in the demonstration of my only twenty-meter-long film, which took
at most two minutes to unfold, the effect was surprising; visible in the same
egg is the formation of the fertilization membrane and the advancing seg-
mentation up to the morula. One really believes one has a living, developing
egg before one.12
While it may seem odd to remark that the surprise of this viewing arises in part
from the knowledge that it is the same egg before the viewer at all times, it is
important to remember that this form of representation—and its particular tem-
porality—stood in contrast to other contemporary forms of depicting develop-
ment. Ries’s earlier attempts at fixing each stage involved a series of different
eggs, each at a different (and he hoped sequential) moment in development. The
very idea of development itself was not inevitable; it had been laboriously “pro-
duced” by late-nineteenth-century embryology, exactly through these sorts of
sequential representations arranged into “Normal tables,” thousands of individ-
ual moments in thousands of individuals built into an ascending temporal series
of static moments.13 To have the same individual specimen “fixed,” as it were, every
seven minutes by the photograph and then put back into a highly foreshortened
moving image of the developmental course by projection was therefore a surprise,
inadequate lighting or no.
Meanwhile, also in Paris, Louise Chevreton and Frederic Vlès made a nine-
minute film of the sea urchin from egg to larva with assistance from the film 
production company Gaumont.14 It seems strange: two of the first time-lapse
microcinematographic films made to be projected were made in the same year in
the same city using the same type of microorganism, by two sets of investigators
working independently of each other without knowledge of the others’ produc-
tion until the two films were finished.15 We can understand this coincidence only
by recognizing what these films do: they seek to visualize not something utterly
unknown but something entirely familiar. Sea urchins were favored model organ-
isms for the study of development and cell division because of their large, trans-
parent cells and their relative accessibility and manipulability. However, the
illustration, proof, and capture of cells to that point was a mass of static images:
fixed and stained cells, microphotographs, diagrams of stages. That they were the
“obvious” choice for animation with film only makes sense in the context of this
previous cycle of codification of observation: these microcinematographers saw a
theory of the living illustrated by dead images and set out to animate those
images, resulting in the doubled perception of the living thing and the theory of
Julius Ries. Fertilization and
Development of the Sea Urchin
Egg, 1909. Stills.
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the living thing on screen.16
Biology is a science of cycles, but it is also composed of its own cycles of obser-
vation and theorization. Ries, Chevreton, and Vlès were not just excited by
observing the thing in itself, the particular sea urchin they had under the micro-
scope on a fine day in 1909, or even by the astonishing regularity that made the
same events happening in different individuals predictable enough to set a clock
by. No, they understood themselves to be simultaneously watching a sea urchin,
and watching Development, Cell Theory, Life, Movement—all of which had been
codified as curves, sections, and diagrams. Theory animates observation (for Ries,
cell theory; for Chevreton and Vlès, graphic physiology); a machine is built to ani-
mate observation’s codification, and the resulting moving image is perceived as
an animation of theory.
This is not a question of true and false representations but of a cycle endlessly
propelled by the competing demands of perceptibility and intelligibility within
biology, in which film makes a difference in relation to previous representations
of life. Certainly Ries’s students already knew about cell division from looking at
static drawings and by peering through microscopes at fixed histological speci-
mens. They also knew from diagrams the putative order of developmental stages.
They had perhaps even seen photographs of these stages. However, what the films
did was to animate the still images—to produce the illusion of movement in the
enormous projection on a screen and demonstrate, unequivocally, what they
could not otherwise see: life. That is to say: we have no trouble, analytically
speaking, in understanding either the mechanism of cell division or the illusion
of the film apparatus. But in order to believe, in order to convince ourselves of
the truth of life, both the image and the cell must be animated. This is not a leap
of faith but precisely that “enormous difference,” that unquantifiable quality by
which a still image “differs from the living in its motionlessness.”
This is not simply a leap of the imagination. Rather, it is precisely the techni-
cal difference between chronophotography and cinematography. Chevreton and
Vlès commented that they could not process the 7,000 to 9,000 stills just by look-
ing at the static film strip; the film had to be run through a projector for its con-
tent to be graspable by the viewer. There was no other access to the phenomenon.
It is movement itself, the movement-image—of film cells and organic cells—that
makes life visible.17 The return to the perception of movement is not a circle right
back to the starting point but is itself a new cycle of observation, revealing previ-
ously “unperceived details” of movement—in this particular case indicating a
kinetics of cell division that would now have to be taken into account in theories
of development.18 The cycle back through observation and belief is required
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either for new generations of biologists or the generation of new theories.
Thus the movement of biology in relation to its moving subjects. The move-
ment of biological thought is also visible to biology’s practitioners. Jean
Comandon, a biologist and filmmaker situated between the world of scientific
research and popular film by working within the Pathé Frères film production
company, made much of the epochal differences between a biology that experi-
mented on living subjects and a former one using dead subjects. He divided
microbiology into three periods: bacteriology, histology, and physiology. During
the era of bacteriology, “one contented oneself then with putting on a glass slide
a drop of liquid, in which one examined a minced fragment of tissue to which
microorganisms were introduced.”19 Despite the fact that the microorganisms
were living, the preparations were poor and the visibility was bad due to the 
feeble contrast between protoplasm and the ambient medium. Thus the idea of
coagulating the protoplasm by heat or fixatives introduced the era of histology.
“That was the second period, the anatomical period,” during which one studied
beings killed by fixation and sectioning. “We live now in the third period that we
can call the physiological period. The laborious researches of our forebears have
put our classifications in order; they have made known to us the structure of
cells.” However, with the power of microcinematography, “now, one observes
them anew in the living state, one can follow their modifications, their evolution;
one experiments on the action of diverse chemical reagents or physical events
that change their milieu.”20
In 1914, while showing a time-lapse microcinematographic film of cell divi-
sion to the members of the Institut Général Psychologique, Comandon drew the
audience’s attention to an entity whose very name derived from histology: chro-
matin, so named for its ability to take up histological dyes. Chromatin, which had
come into existence for biologists as a thing killed by its visualization, was neither
colored nor dead on film. It was animated, in all its brilliance, by cinematography,
making the audience see not just the thing in motion, but see anew the thing and
its name and the conditions of its visibility.
You see a kind of brilliant reticulum, formed of a substance, chromatin, so
named because it selectively takes up certain colors that are used in histology.
Caryocinesis has in effect up to now scarcely been studied other than with
histological procedures, on dead cells, fixed and then colored, submitted,
in sum, to so many manipulations that certain authors have even denied the
real existence of these figures, so curious and so complex, that you will see
following one upon the other.21
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Again there is an admixture of technique and belief. The technique of histol-
ogy had been designed to visualize life. This led to the attempt to study life in
dead cells, and the manipulations of fixing and staining cells led some to disbe-
lieve that chromosomes formed these mitotic figures altogether. While these dead
figures had “put our classifications in order” and elaborated the structure of the
cell, it was then necessary to return to the observation of life. For Comandon,
microcinematography, by contrast to the doubt and artifactuality of histology,
produced a “gripping truth.”
While one method’s proponents may understandably disparage another, the
movement of visualization techniques should not be understood as a succession
of techniques supplanted in series, because it is exactly the necessity of the back-
and-forth between perception and intelligibility that constitutes the comprehen-
sion of life. This back-and-forth begins to appear, with the advent of better
splicing techniques, within single microcinematographic films. For example, in
The Cultivation of Living Tissue (1927) by Ronald Canti, the film cuts between a
hand drawing a diagram of the cell on the board, a static cartoon with its
organelles labeled, and time-lapse sequences of living cells, writhing and crawling
across the field of view as a chronometer twirls in the upper-right-hand corner of
the frame. Another striking aspect of Canti’s films is their demonstration that the
Kelty and Landecker | A Theory of Animation: Cells, L-systems, and Film 41
biological concept of death can also be animated with film. The teeming field of
dividing cells is subjected to intense radiation, and as the moments swirl by,
counted by the chronometer, all movement ceases and the viewer is left shocked
by the stillness within the moving image.
Part 2: Formalization and Death
As it became clearer over the twentieth century that cell death was not a simple
cessation of life but a complex physiological process of organized dying common
to all cells at all stages of life in all organisms (much like cell division), the role
of film in animating death became more important.22 In 1976 scientists trying to
elaborate the process of cell death exploited the properties of film to aid in the
perception of the sequence of dying, the “death agony” of the cell:
Films were examined in a photo optical data analyzer . . . which allowed
forward and reverse examination at different speeds. . . . In general, the
most suitable technique was found to be a retrospective examination,
starting with a dead cell towards the end of a film and following it back-
wards. This enabled the cell to be observed before and through the phases
of death.23
The dead cell could be, like a cartoon character flattened by a truck, animated
back to life, backward, to determine the exact course of dying.
In the late 1980s genes controlling the suppression or triggering of cell death
during nematode development were mapped. By the 1990s the study of the genetic
and molecular action of this process of death had become one of the hottest fields
of biological research and the subject of the 2003 Nobel Prize for Medicine.
Biologist William R. Clark gives a dramatized account of the search for the mech-
anism by which cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) kill cells that are damaged or
foreign. He recounts that scientists were looking for “a smoking gun or bloody
knife, for a rope or traces of poison,” but no matter how much they studied the
process “from start to end, no truly believable weapon could be found.”
And then one day . . . someone decided to take a closer look at the target cell
in its death throes, just after it had received the “kiss of death” from a killer
T cell. . . . Enlarged images were projected on a screen, run forward and
backward; sped up and slowed down. As expected, the CTLs approached
the targets, bumping and probing and then locking on tightly for several
minutes. But as the target cell was released from the CTLs embrace, it began
to do what everyone suddenly realized was the classic cellular dance of
Ronald Canti. The Cultivation 
of Living Tissue, 1927. Stills.
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death. . . . This sent scientists racing back to the lab to monitor the state of
the target cell’s DNA during the killing reaction.24
Only through seeing the “classic cellular dance of death”—by watching the
behavior of two cells in time “before and through the phases of death” on film—
could these scientists discover that the cytotoxic T cell did not kill the target cell;
rather it signaled it to kill itself. This observable phenomenon was formalized as
“apoptosis” or “programmed cell death” and is now characterized by specific
quantifiable molecular changes, such as a cell’s enzymes cutting its own DNA
into pieces. However, Clark’s narration implies that somehow cinematography is
not a laboratory procedure like DNA analysis; the cinema-going scientist has to
return to the lab after the film, perhaps to track down what is really happening at
the next level of subvisibility, and so on from perceptibility to intelligibility.
Why is it only in the last decade of the twentieth century that cell death is rec-
ognized by the biological research community as a fundamental property of all
living beings at all stages of the life cycle? The answer, in short, is that cell death
had been “seen”—observed, studied, commented upon, plenty of times before,
but as we have said, observable regularity is a necessary but inadequate prole-
gomenon to formalization. Film provided the plot—scientists raced back to the
lab; genetic and molecular analysis ensued; and a biological theory of cell death
as integral to ongoing life began to take on a certain life of its own, “invading not
only the minds of many biologists but also many fields of biology.”25
Henri Bergson commented, in observing science, that one of the difficulties
posed by the symbols by which our intellect represents biological objects to us is
the problem—at once technical and philosophical—of the time of the object and
the time of its representation. “We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the
immobile, in the dead. The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to
comprehend life.”26 Thus the interplay of the perceptible and the intelligible in
microcinematography speaks to the larger scene of biology: living beings change
continuously over time, and, as a result, biology’s experimental techniques
include a repertoire of means with which to halt, suspend, freeze, denature, or
otherwise hold its innately dynamic subjects still, in forms amenable to visual-
ization, representation, analysis, exhibition, exchange, or storage. From collec-
tors’ cabinets to freeze-drying, from histology to electron microscopy, from
dissection to DNA sequencing, biology is armed with methods to stop a being in
its tracks, to stop it at a particular point in its life (which often means to kill it) in
order to study it. These techniques exist in a tense reciprocity with those that
observe the living organism over time; for example, vivisection or vital staining.
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Media that represent the living organism over time, such as time-lapse microcin-
ematography, not only demonstrate the life of the organism in question, they also
animate it in relation to other, often dominant, modes of static representation.
However, in the historical record, it is generally the analysis that remains and
the mode of initial observation that falls away. Microcinematography is not gen-
erally recognized as significant to the making of biological science, despite its
constant role of reminding biologists that their subjects are alive. Even in 1962,
C.H. Waddington wrote that “many biologists still seem to experience something
of a shock when they see such films and realize that cells have to be considered as
highly active bodies in which movement of the internal constituents is con-
tinuous and uninterrupted.”27 Like Ries, Waddington felt film was a necessary 
corrective to the de-animating effects of microscopic technique. While he read-
ily admitted that “Time-lapse films, of course, exaggerate the speed with which
these movements are carried out,” he also argued that “the point they bring home
so forcefully, that cytoplasm is always in a state of physical activity, is a perfectly
valid one.” In fact, exaggeration was “useful to counterbalance our tendency to
envisage cells in terms of the static pictures presented by ordinary microscope
preparations.”28
Such images of cells were also critiqued as not only insufficient analytical
tools, but distracting ones. The biologist Peter Medawar described people doing
time-lapse cinematography in the 1920s and 1930s as having been “delighted,
distracted, and beguiled by the sheer beauty of the cultivated cells” and as a result
having missed the opportunity to use cell culture to—as he put it—“solve bio-
logical problems.”29 The criticism voiced by Medawar is only one specimen of the
constant call to formalization: what good will “just looking” at life do, when there
are immune reactions to figure out, forces to quantify, DNA to sequence, regular-
ities to ferret out?
Here, at yet another turning from observation to formalization, we begin to
address the question of what the “analog” image of the dividing sea urchin egg in
1909 has to do with the “digital” image of the brain in 1999. What binds these two
confrontations of static media with time, movement, and the organic? One way
to approach this question is to shift the focus from the images themselves to their
construction. Much as an understanding of the filmic apparatus can clarify the
illusion of movement, so too can a short genealogical excursion through mathe-
matical formalization of biology give us an understanding of the relation between
the initial observations of the movement constituting plant growth, the interme-
diary formal grammar for describing branching structures, and the final digitally
cultivated image of the living, thinking brain.
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Aristid Lindenmayer, botanist and developer of L-systems (L for Lindenmayer),
the formal grammar used to make the Fight Club opening sequence, was from 
the start guided by a desire to axiomatize biological knowledge; that is, to see 
biological facts as axioms or statements from which theorems might be derived
through deductive logic. Such an endeavor of formalization would, in the eyes 
of many, make biology a true science. Lindenmayer turned first to J.H. Woodger 
for help in understanding how mathematical logic (in particular, the logical 
calculus of Russell and Whitehead) might be imported into biology.30 The 
system Woodger invented was based on the predicate calculus of Russell and
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica and consisted of a set of logical operators.
These included:
P  (part of)
T (before in time)
mom (momentary)
B and E (beginning and ending slices of time)
org (organized unity)
U (division/fusion of an org)
wh (whole orgs with B and E)31
These logical operators were intended to stand in for components of biological
knowledge, thereby using empirical biological work as the basis of axioms from
which biological theorems could then be derived.32
Woodger’s attempts were pencil-and-paper exercises in writing logical state-
ments and using the calculus to verify them. To “do” biology in this sense was to
“observe” these forms—to engage the mathematical imagination, to imagine a set
of statements about biological organisms as if they were axioms of the Principia,
and to calculate using its theorems. Outcomes of calculations on properly stated
axioms would be, in short, answers to biological questions. Woodger was steadfast
in his desire for an axiomatic and logically consistent system (though modest in
his own claims to have achieved it):
An intense interest in, and intimate first-hand acquaintance with, organisms,
indispensable as it is, will not alone lead biology to the goal of an exact 
science. If “form” is the essence of the whole business, it is necessary that
theoretical biologists should concentrate on the discernment of the form of
biological fact and cultivate the study of the abstractly embodied forms
offered by pure mathematics and logistic.33
Where Ries or Comandon looked at histological codification of cell division
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and thought something essentially lacking, an insufficient scientific representation
which crucially differed from the living object in its motionlessness, Woodger
saw representational insufficiency in the other direction: inadequate mathemat-
ical symbolization. Observation alone—mere “acquaintance with organisms”—
differed crucially from the logical in its motion, its continuity. While the desire
to visualize life remains constant, this is the complement to microcinematogra-
phy, the attempt to animate mere observation with lively theory through new
forms of codification.
Woodger’s sentiment echoes across the twentieth century and is perhaps most
salient in the heart of modern theoretical biology and computer science. It is 
perhaps the first taste of an attitude toward logic (like that of theoreticians of 
formal languages and artificial life) that deliberately experiences it as something
almost alive—something with a form of its own that must be observed, illus-
trated, and cultivated like life itself. That it was manifestly associated with 
the study of things fully and obviously alive, rather than with the dead symbols 
of mathematics or the inorganic offerings of chemistry, simply blurred the 
lines further.
Lindenmayer made a valiant attempt to extend Woodger’s original work in a
paper titled “Life cycles as hierarchical relations.”34 Following Woodger’s lead,
and using the idioms of the Principia Mathematica, Lindenmayer delivered a
similar array of dense symbolic logical statements covering modern biological
knowledge—but they differed in a crucial way. His 1964 paper used only three
simple primitives: mitosis, meiosis, and fusion. It was cellularity (the organism
as a sum of discrete but repetitive entities) that characterized Lindenmayer’s
approach. And to see cellularity clearly, it was necessary to see mathematical
logic clearly. Lindenmayer explains: “Theories are considered in modern logic as
languages.” For Lindenmayer the theories rendered from biological experimenta-
tion (e.g., the stages of mitosis or meiosis) are not just statements; they are 
languages. They are not just sets of equations or strings of hieroglyphics but 
complete systems with specific, enumerated grammars capable of generating 
new forms.
Lindenmayer’s claim that theories can be seen as languages and that languages
have a logical structure might seem obvious, but we suggest it should in fact be
read as a kind of discovery: a discovery that by representing theories as languages,
they can be observed.35 However, the implication of this discovery did not become
clear until Lindenmayer moved away from the mathematics of the logical calcu-
lus and toward the theory of computing machines. In 1964 such observation of
language was difficult for two reasons: one, it involved differential equations
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whose solution would have required far more computing power than was then
available; and two, because it was difficult to see the logical description as 
anything but the organisms it purported to represent. The form of the description
was rigid—it was subordinate to, and had the same structure of relations as, the
description of the organism.
But conceived of as “languages,” theories become like the biology they purport
to describe: natural, evolving forms with dynamics and features all their own.
This doubling of life by the languages that describe life will become especially
fecund when these languages are not imagined (with the aid of pen and paper)
but programmed into machines and, like the life they describe, are literally observed
over time—languages that come alive because they are given a new home in dis-
crete machines that operate in continuous time. Because they are themselves 
logical, computing machines help figure out what a theory looks like. On screens,
in printouts, they show the scientist what happens to a theory over time.36
Part 3: Do Words Live?
She said the hardest thing to teach her three-year-old kid was what was
alive and what wasn’t. The phone rings and she holds it out to her kid and
says, “It’s Grandma. Talk to Grandma.” But she’s holding a piece of plastic.
And the kid says: “Hey, wait a minute. Is the phone alive? Is the TV alive?
What about that radio? What is alive in this room and what isn’t?”
Unfortunately, she doesn’t know how to ask these questions.37
Patchcords in one hand and potentiometer knob in another, the modeler
observes through the screen of an oscilloscope selected aspects of the
model’s behavior and adjusts the model’s parameters . . . until its behavior
satisfies his criteria. To anyone who has had the pleasure of close inter-
action with a good fast responsive analog simulation, a mathematical 
model consisting of mere pencil marks on paper is likely to seem a static,
lifeless thing.38
In 1968 Lindenmayer proposed a novel way of modeling a biological organism:
he borrowed a formalism from the nascent theory of computer science that was
capable of powerfully representing the cellularity of an organism.39 For an arcane
theoretical paper that combined relatively new and difficult concepts from the
mathematics of computing machines with the study of the growth and develop-
ment of filamentous organisms, its impact was profound. Not only was this a
provocative model of developmental growth in certain kinds of organisms, it
L-Systems example, based on
Lindenmayer, “Mathematical
Models for Cellular Interactions
in Development (I & II),” 1968.
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spawned a subfield of the mathematics of formal languages that, by 1996, had pro-
duced an estimated 5,000 articles and merited extensive coverage in the three-
volume Handbook of Formal Languages.41 Indeed, the productivity of the
mathematical formalism would eventually overwhelm its usefulness as a biolog-
ical theory.
An L-system is a “formal language.” Though L-systems are often referred to by
the terms alphabet, grammar, or language, they are mathematically formalized
concepts. In Lindenmayer’s 1968 description (see example and figure above), the
cells of an organism are represented formally by their positions on a line, and
each position contains a symbol, which shows the cell’s state, in this example a 
0 or a 1 (this two-symbol “alphabet” is given at the outset). A set of rules—a gram-
mar—governs how these numbers change state from line to line. The grammar
can be programmed as a set of operations to be carried out by a computer (as
Lindenmayer’s first models were on an IBM 1620 and 7040, in FORTRAN II). The
rules themselves can be given any number of biological interpretations (e.g., in
the example above they may refer to some kind of chemical or physical instruc-
tions). These early attempts had no pictorial (i.e., on-screen) component, but the
movement of the program was produced as printouts. Just as instruments of
graphic physiology traced the movement of organisms over time, these printouts
traced the movement of the model of the organism over time. For instance, the
example from Lindenmayer’s article might help the reader see what an L-system
representation of a simple one-dimensional cellular organism looks like as 
it develops.
Example. Starting from the top, each new row is a step forward in time.40 Each new row uses the four 
provided rules to “re-write” the previous row as a new row, which Lindenmayer originally conceived of 
as a growing linear ﬁlament of algae that starts out as a single cell, becoming longer with each line; the 
curve visible here is to be seen as the “growth” caused by the division of cells in the preceding line.
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In this simplified case, it is possible to work out each successive stage of
“development” by following the rules and replacing each row with the next. This
example could be produced by hand, on paper, but as the authors of one of the
earliest computer programs point out: “To find out the way in which a cellular
iterative array will develop is a very tedious job without the help of a computer. In
fact, in all but the simplest cases, time would put a stop to a pencil and paper
attempt to follow the pattern of development.”42
From this point, the time-lapse of computation is essential to the observation
of L-systems development. Even simple adjustments (adding more rules, making
a rule nondeterministic) require enlisting the aid of a computer and printer. Just
as the small dark gap between images on the film strip held in it not only all the
labor of prolonged observation but also the physiological limit of the human eye
to perceive motion, so the ability of the machine to process and condense the
“lapse” between moments/lines was an essential part of the perception of devel-
opment or movement in computation. And as with cinematography, the actual
implementation, the software, is perceived as technical and secondary to the 
formal presentation and does not appear in many publications. Nonetheless, it is
only via the process of programming a machine to calculate an L-system that one
can claim to see a “theory” over time. Like Ries, who had to go through the
machine of the cinematographic projector to access “the complete phenomenon”
of development in motion, the computer is necessary to the visualization of
development over time. Imagining development, such as Woodger had attempted,
is suddenly much less interesting than the practice of waiting for and watching
a language develop in a computer over time.
The 1968 papers were a breakthrough for Lindenmayer, who had struggled to
find a path from continuous to discrete representations of biology. In a 1983 inter-
view he noted his long-standing interest in “structures which are partly contin-
uous and partly discrete.” The structures could be colloidal suspensions, or they
could be cellular organisms.43 Again we see the powerful confrontation with
time, movement, and the organic which has always troubled the biological 
sciences. The concern over the description of biological organisms as continuous
or discrete brought Lindenmayer to the study of “sequential” or “finite state”
machines—the subject of the then young field of computer science. In particular,
it gave him a way to model organisms as collections of cells—just as the “finite
state” machine was always pictured as a set of connected, discrete boxes or circles.
How did Lindenmayer make this transition between 1964 and 1968?44 The
apocryphal story goes like this: Aristid Lindenmayer was walking through the halls
of his university and passed a lecture room in which a professor lectured on 
Finite State Machines. 
Top: Seymour Ginsburg, 
An Introduction to Mathematical
Machine Theory, 1962, p. 8;
Middle: John E. Hopcroft and
Jeffrey D. Ullman, Formal
Languages and Their Relation 
to Automata, 1969, p. 27; 
Bottom: Marvin Minsky,
Computation: Finite and Infinite
Machines, 1967, pp. 13 and 117.
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formal languages. The instructor talked about the relationship between strings and
words, languages and grammars, referring repeatedly to a language L formed from
grammar G, or L(G). The young Lindenmayer heard not symbols but, of course, a
word: algae. L(G). Algae. It is perhaps not an accident, therefore, that the first
organism modeled by L-systems was also algae, Callithamnion roseum—or perhaps
it is only because Lindenmayer knew algae that he could see clearly the possible
uses of L(G). Chicken/egg.
Lindenmayer’s deliberately illogical connection—seeing L(G) as algae—was
perhaps not so odd at the time. L(G) was in the water. John von Neumann’s work
on cellular automata was written as early as 1948, but republished in 1966;45 the
work of McCulloch and Pitts46 had become the subject of Kleene’s famous paper
on “nerve nets” as regular languages, which led to a host of work on “finite
automatons”;47 Stanislaw Ulam had published a paper on “the growth of figures,”48
and a variety of other attempts to model biological organisms were already 
underway. Lindenmayer used Seymour Ginsburg’s early work Mathematical
Machine Theory,49 which itself suggests that sequential machines are everywhere
(“safes, vending machines, data processors”). This provided Lindenmayer 
with a way to imagine a line of cells (a filament) as a number of sequential
machines all processing inputs and changing states—perhaps depending on the
states of the cells around them. As obvious as it might seem in hindsight, the
connection is necessarily an imaginative one based in an understanding of real
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biological phenomena filtered through real mathematical logic and confronting
problems of continuous and discrete representation. Regardless of its subse-
quent success, there remains, ironically, no logical reason to imagine that algae
are L(G). At best it is a poetic match-up between the ubiquitous cells of biology
and the equally ubiquitous lines and circles of early computer science. As a result,
the 1968 papers are relentlessly mimetic—symbols are referred to as “cells” almost
from the beginning. Each stage of the theory is accompanied by a statement of the
form “much like that observed in plant shoots and roots” and the use of the words
basal, apical, and helical to refer to the sequences of zeroes and ones.
Interest in L-systems took off nearly immediately. Throughout the seventies
and eighties a variety of attempts were made to use L-systems in experimental or
theoretical biological contexts, many of which were coauthored by Lindenmayer
or his students. Because one of the initial simplifications of L-systems was the
assumption of a static configuration of cells (cells in L-systems have constant
neighbors, and they don’t move about), there could be only an avowedly herba-
ceous interpretation; hence the vocabulary of apices and helical structures, the
imagery of roots, trees, branching, and rhizomes. Animal cells move and jostle,
as was evident to the microcinematographers of the twentieth century, and are
therefore unsuitable to being represented as arrays of fixed blocks with constant
neighbors. Even animation has its limits.50
Lindenmayer’s struggle with the problems of the continuous and the discrete
in the representation of organisms and of theories is nicely illustrated by one of
his assumptions: “Cell death can be represented by introducing an ‘empty state’
(e), which is needed for theoretical reasons anyway, and having some combina-
tions of states and inputs, e.g., p and q such that ∂(p,q) = e.”51 Because the model
is intended to simulate the development of a cellular organism, it seems only nat-
ural that some notion of death be present. Whereas a model of, for instance, crys-
tal formation might not require a notion of death, mathematical formalism
necessitates the existence of an empty set, as Lindenmayer says, “for theoretical
reasons anyway.” It is unclear which comes first, death or the theoretical, but the
necessity of the empty state is not driven by a biological observation, but only by
the insistent problem of continuity in both cells and machines. One way to grasp
the problem is to ask the question, When one cell divides into two, what happens
to the first one? Does it “die”? Does it “disappear”? Or does it become two cells?
Does it “give birth” to one cell? To two? Finite state machines have no way to 
represent the notion of a cell becoming continuously smaller or larger except
through a discrete change of state. How one decides the answers to these questions
determines what kind of L-system one uses; namely, a “propagating” or “non-
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propagating” L-system. The assumption that an organism has states leads to the
creation of different formal symbolisms than from those focused on capturing a
continuously changing organism. And while it is true that an infinitely fine series
of different states may well capture something like continuity, the very real tem-
poral limits of the discrete computer intervene.
In 1968 theoretical biologist Brian Goodwin commented that the two main
types of computer currently available, analog and digital, reflect with remarkable
fidelity two quite different approaches to the analysis of biological systems.
Analog approaches, he said, emphasize the dynamic, continuous aspects of
processes such as physiological activity, while the digital approach emphasizes
the quasi-static, discontinuous, logical aspects of phenomena such as speciation
in genetics. Fields like embryonic development are therefore particularly theo-
retically intractable because they incorporate both aspects. He proposed a kind
of hybrid machine of the two but wrote that “which partner is regarded as ulti-
mately ruling the whole machine depends upon the point of view and whether
your sympathies lie with Bergson or with Russell.”52
Lindenmayer was troubled by precisely this tension. It is ironic, therefore that
the biological usefulness of L-systems was eventually swamped by the interest
from mathematics and computer science. The enthusiasm is attributed to the 
special characteristics of L-systems as compared to other formal languages (e.g.,
cellular automata, regular languages, or pushdown automata): the fundamentally
parallel system of rewriting. In the example given above, for example, all of the
cells in a given row are to be replaced at once; if the rules were applied sequen-
tially rather than in parallel, then the state of the cell to the left could change
before the rule was applied to the next cell, leading to different outcomes. Such
differences have both mathematical implications and interpretive (biological)
ones. The choice made by Lindenmayer to have all of the cells change state at
once betrays an almost metaphysical assumption about the homogenous nature
of time in a biological organism. Time, in the L-system, progresses as a series 
of discrete steps, and cells are assumed to go through time together, as it were,
neither faster nor slower than one another. Though this interpretation is meant 
to capture the centrality of time to the living organism, there is but one time-
image at work in the language of L-systems: that of the regular pulse of the
computer chip.
Part 4: Interpretation
By the early 1980s L-systems were so successful that their biological justification
began to seem less and less essential. Lindenmayer himself at this juncture said,
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“it is probably better to accept the fact that each mathematical theory has its own
life and internal development, and it certainly is not the task of biologists to tell
mathematicians what they should or should not find interesting or worth pursu-
ing.”53 The diversity of possible extensions was of significantly more interest to
computer scientists and mathematicians than it was to biologists—though part of
the charm and aesthetic appeal of L-systems no doubt derived from their biolog-
ical origin. However, because biologists could do little with L-systems does not
mean that we leave the domain of life or of the visualization and animation of life
or its theories. Quite the contrary, because each mathematical theory has its own
life and internal development, we are quite literally confronted with the question
of whether L-systems themselves are alive.
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe chose, as an epigraph to his famous work on The
Metamorphosis of Plants, a line from Epictetus: “What disturbs men’s minds is
not things themselves, but the interpretations placed upon them.” Henri Bergson’s
Creative Evolution echoes the sentiment, stating, “simplicity belongs to the object
itself.” Infinite complexity, on the other hand, belongs to “the views we take in
turning around [the object], to the symbols by which our senses or intellect rep-
resent it to us, or more generally, to elements of a different order, with which we
try to imitate it artificially, but with which it remains incommensurable, being of
a different nature.”54 Such questions are familiar to the discourse or discipline of
“artificial life” wherein the insistence that moving images on a screen are “really
alive” or “really natural” has been extensively discussed.55 While L-systems fit firmly
among the tools and techniques of artificial life (including the cellular automata
of John von Neumann, John Conway’s game Life, and the so-called genetic algo-
rithms), it is not the case that all theoretical computer scientists consider them-
selves “artificial life” researchers; in fact, probably only a very few do. Nonetheless,
all of them are confronted with a question of the interpretation, in the sense that
both Goethe and Bergson gave it, of what they write on paper and what they
watch on their computer screens.
As mentioned above, Lindenmayer’s early attempts to model biological theory
with the Principia Mathematica led to a relationship of resemblance, whereby
the relations of biological theory were made to resemble the relations of the 
logical calculus. The finite state–machine representation, on the other hand, is
slightly different. The resemblance between the machine and the theory is not a
correspondence of relations but only a shared assumption of cellular state and
discrete temporal development. That an L-system is (or models, or represents) a
biological organism is only one among many interpretations. An L-system is by
itself a thing: a logical machine that is observed to unfold in time. Whether or not
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it does this in a manner similar to that other machine,
the cell, depends on the interpretations or images
given to the L-system by the human manipulating it.
The cells of the machine are not required to be only
the cells of an organism but can also be modules of a
plant (inflorescences) or regions of a cell (as in the
Fight Club sequence, which models the axons and
dendrites of a single cell), or any other “cellular”
structure. L-systems as theories are of a different
order than organisms—and yet the views we take in
turning round both theories and organisms are strik-
ingly similar.
There is also a second sense in which interpreta-
tion comes to play a role in L-systems—and here it is
the technical term used by computer graphics spe-
cialists themselves: it is when the strings of symbols
that may or may not be algae are given a visual repre-
sentation as algae, or as plants, or as neurons.56 If the
first interpretation is a textual or rhetorical claim that
a given set of symbols are a certain kind of algae, the
second interpretation is simply the replacement of
these symbols (and the claim of being biological) by
a picture of algae. The process by which this computer
graphical representation of an L-system is possible
requires another layer of computing power, another
confrontation with the vagaries of the continuous and
the discrete, and another trip through Hollywood.
Among the many filmic representations of artifi-
cial life, or of science fiction images of life in or out of
control, one occupies a special historical place. In
Star Trek: The Wrath of Khan (aka Star Trek II; 1982),
starring Ricardo Montalban, there is a scene in which
a powerful technology is demonstrated to Admiral
Kirk, Captain Spock, and Captain McCoy. Dubbed
“Project Genesis,” it transforms dead and lifeless planets into lush blue-green
globes. In the film, Kirk, Bones, and Spock watch a simulation of this process on
a computer screen. The sixty-second scene—a flyover of a barren moon that is
first covered with fire, then transformed into a mountainous blue-green planet—
Project Genesis sequence, 
Star Trek: The Wrath of Khan.
Dir. Nicholas Meyer, 1982.
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was one of the first full-screen 3D graphics scenes in a Hollywood movie. It is 
perhaps ironic that this demo-within-a-demo should have been created using, in
part, lively formalisms like those of L-systems. It was the science fiction dream
of a complete reorganization of matter into a new reality, mirrored inside the soft-
ware by the reorganization of a formal biological theory into a graphical repre-
sentation of this fantasy.57
Project director Alvy Ray Smith at Industrial Light and Magic (George Lucas’s
special effects company) insists that this was a special chance for his team to
show that computer graphics (CG) could be used to simulate a scene rather than
simply appear on the computer screens of profilmic actors.58 The Star Trek II
demo represented a chance to demonstrate to Hollywood just how powerful com-
puter graphics techniques had become by 1981.
Prior to his career in CG, Smith had been a computer scientist working on cellu-
lar automata; he later became famous for his work at Pixar, including on Toy Story.
What made the Star Trek II demo historically significant in terms of computer
graphics was the use of what Smith called “database amplification” techniques,
including those drawn from formal languages, as well as the work of Benoit
Mandelbrot on fractals. Loren Carpenter used a simple fractal graph-replacement
grammar to model the mountains that would appear on the planet as it was trans-
formed. By setting a small set of rules (the database to be amplified) for the
replacement of simple shapes (triangles), what appeared on the screen was an
excellent facsimile of mountains, generated entirely by the machine. That is, rather
than painstakingly illustrating a mountain in each frame, the triangle mountains
were “grown” (just like the brain of Fight Club) from frame to frame, then given
an “interpretation”: color, texture, and shadow to give the mountains a familiar look.
Smith explained these techniques (and the notion of “interpretation”) in a
paper (“Plants, Fractals and Formal Languages”) presented at the 1984 SIGGRAPH
conference. The paper is an explanation of how to use “graftals” (including L-
systems) to generate pleasing graphical images of plants and, importantly, plant
development. Both L-systems and Mandelbrot’s fractals, according to Smith, are
modes of “database amplification,” which is “very important for the construction
of satisfyingly complex scenes in reasonably short times.”59 That is, like the
painstaking observation of a dividing cell, the painstaking creation of an animated
one simply takes too much time.
L-systems, as designed by Lindenmayer, do not by themselves generate visual
images. They are only strings of numbers or letters. In order for an L-system to
look like an organism, layers of “interpretation” must be applied to turn them
into graphical images. First the symbols must be given an interpretation as graphs
Fractal and graftal images from
Alvy Ray Smith, “Plants, Fractals,
and Formal Languages,” ACM
Computer Graphics, 1984. 
Upper right: Images from Star
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(points, lines, and nodes with particular directions or angles); then these graphs
must be given a visual interpretation (a cylinder for a filament or a stem, a disc
for a cell, an angle of branching, etc.). Smith’s article explains: “The (geometric)
trees generated are considered to be data structure maps, not necessarily the final
image. A post-processing step, called an interpretation, expands this map, assumed
to have only a finite amount of information at each node (finite alphabet), into the
final image.”60 It is important to realize that this notion of interpretation refers not
only to the replacement of one humanly perceivable geometrical shape by
another but to the implementation in a software program of a systematic replace-
ment of one string of symbols for another. This “interpretation” is fully formalis-
tic, but it is created only with reference to what human beings can perceive on a
screen or what Hollywood demands appear there.61
Smith discusses some of the techniques for going from the discrete represen-
tation to the continuous, a process he achieves using a program called GENE
(named, presumably, for the biological object, not Gene Rodenberry, creator of 
Star Trek), which gives the “genotype” (L-system string) a “phenotype” (graphical
interpretation) using a variety of established CG techniques (such as anti-aliasing,
lighting effects, dropped shadows). Through this process Smith has given the for-
mal languages of Lindenmayer a (new) visual form, a pattern, an interpretation
that one can watch on a screen as it unfolds. This interpretation might look like
mountains (as in Star Trek II), or it might look like nerve cells (as in Fight Club),
or, ironically, it might look, as in the case of the animations of Przemyslaw
Prusinkiewicz, like developing plants.
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Prusinkiewicz’s 1990 book, written with Lindenmayer and titled The
Algorithmic Beauty of Plants, is a beautifully illustrated collection of tech-
niques for producing just such graphical interpretations. The parallels
with the work of D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson are highlighted, and it is
those common natural forms—the branching tree, the logarithmic spiral
of phyllotaxis, the self-similarity of ferns—that repeatedly provides the
essential aesthetic pleasure and motivation of the book. In the book
Prusinkiewicz develops the “turtle” interpretation for L-systems, a way of
formally describing the creation of line segments, or their rewriting, as if
created by a tiny turtle who moves in three-dimensional space and can
rotate or change direction laterally and is “reading” an L-system as its
instructions.
Here, as in all of his published work, Prusinkiewicz gives Alvy Ray
Smith credit as the originator of the idea of database amplification and the
demonstration of graphical interpretation of L-systems. The fact that
Prusinkiewicz chooses to give L-systems a visual form of developing plants
might seem obvious—this is after all what L-systems were developed to
do. However, Smith’s contribution shows that there is no reason inherent
in L-systems that would require them to represent plants rather than
mountains or neurons. Even if helped along by the original motivation, the
connection must still be imagined, as it was in the case of algae/L(G).
In Prusinkiewicz’s films what is made visible is not a plant’s imperceptible
movement but a theory’s. The only way to see the image on the screen is to know
why (theoretically) it is there in the first place. Prusinkiewicz is in this way anal-
ogous to Ries. When Julius Ries showed his students films of the sea urchin, he
forced them to see a particular theory of life—grounded in cell theory, movement,
and time—and claimed for it self-evidence. Prusinkiewicz’s interpretation forces
the viewer to see a theory of biological development (also grounded in cellular-
ity and developmental programs) cleverly disguised as a time-lapse image of a
growing plant. The visual form is necessitated only by the perceptual limits, or
aesthetic desires, of an observing human being. The rest happens at lightning
speed, in the silicon and metal registers of a machine.
Conclusion
Viewed in the context of a century of visualizing life, the Fight Club opening
sequence is an unwitting literalization of Deleuze’s “the brain is the screen,”62 an
instance of cinema that produces an “image of thought, a visual and acoustic 
rendering of thought in relation to time and movement.”63 Reconnecting this
Bellflower simulation, 
Przemslaw Prusinkiewicz, 
The Algorithmic Beauty 
of Plants, 1990.
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sequence to a larger historical context of the observation, formalization, and inter-
pretation of life, what becomes evident is its status as animation and the condi-
tions under which its image of the brain may be easily greeted by viewers as alive.
It is the result, and a continuation, of the constant confrontation of problems of
time, movement, discreteness, and continuity in the life sciences and cinema.
Scientific observation and formal analyses constitute a helical structure—
which, as it unfolds in time, presents more clearly the face of one and then the
other. Often in the history of biology the observation of life—the eye-straining,
world-denying hard work of observation—is seen as mere prolegomena to an
analysis. But the dynamic constraints of visual perception over time are as nec-
essary to the life sciences as the static constraints of formal construction; never—
at least never so long as life is understood as a temporal problem—will one
triumph over the other. The histological codifications and dictums of nineteenth-
century cell theory were seen to differ in their stillness from the obvious and fre-
netic facts of living cells kept warm and vital under the lens of a microscope.
Static plates and colored preparations representing cell division were rejected as
inadequate for the purpose of teaching others to understand, perhaps to believe,
the very theory they claimed to prove. At the same time, they became the analyt-
ical basis for conceiving of, and then making, time-lapse motion pictures of sea
urchin development.
Similarly, L-systems grew from a perceived defect of observations of living
things: they lack formal, systematic, or logical coherence—but the theory of L-
systems nonetheless draws fundamentally on the cellularity of observed living
things. In turn, the interpretation given to such forms on a computer screen gives
rise to new observable forms: brains, mountains, or abstract patterns—patterns
in search of a phenomenon, perhaps. Both cell biologists and computer pro-
grammers have built machines and media to force a theory of cellularity to
become visible—on screen and in time. In these different media the representa-
tion of the cell remains central as the connection between stillness and movement,
whether as a single-frame image or a symbol occupying a space on a line. It is
simultaneously the location and the means by which one becomes many.
At the end of “Plants, Fractals, and Formal Languages,” Alvy Ray Smith intro-
duces a strange character: “After the machine has done its work, the artist may
step in and modulate the computed form with esthetic judgment, thus becoming
the composer of the image.”64 This pathetic and debased artistic genius, reduced
to the dial-twisting modulator of aesthetic judgment, looking only at the final
pleasing image on the screen, is in our story replaced by the more general cate-
gory of animator. It is not a question of who is an artist, who a scientist, but of the
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work that generates animation, of the place of that work in the helix of the 
perceptible and intelligible that continuously twists from microscope to human
being to scientific paper to microscope to film camera to textbook to mathemati-
cal description to computer program to human being to textbook to graphics
workstation to screen to human being.
To quote the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, who also clearly thought through cell
theory, we have sought here to follow the cell through its presence in twentieth-
century media as the “tangible immaterial means of representation for every-
thing.” Scientific and artistic objects, sea urchin embryos and science fiction
mountains, are “realities that emerge from handwork,” that of animators tinkering
with machines and media.
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